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In 1995 the Service Employees International Union Local 509 and four Massachu-
setts human service providers signed an unusual agreement to forge a partnership
in which employers would remain neutral while the union approached its workers
with an offer to advocate in the state legislature for greater funding for private
human service employees and to promote cooperative relations with their employ-
ers. This study examines the context of the agreement and the pressures on public
employee unions and small human service providers whose workforce copes with
low wages, high turnover, meager benefits, and poor public image as well as the
give-and-take between union and employer representatives and their effort to pro-
vide representation for a growing number ofpoorly paid, often part-time human
service workers.
Prologue
At a well-attended press conference held at the Boston Park Plaza Hotel on December
14, 1995, those present heard an announcement of the creation of a new partnership
between Local 509 of the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) and several
Massachusetts private agencies that offer mental health and retardation services. This
revelation heralded a unique development in the history of labor relations. Prior to en-
gaging in collective bargaining, a group of private employers agreed to work with a
union to raise incomes for employees and to allow the union to organize the employees
without interference. Indeed, the union representatives and providers met frequently and
intensively for many months. Both parties engaged in serious discussions without vio-
lating the rules set by the National Labor Relations Act, which prohibit actual negotia-
tions prior to the recognition of a duly constituted collective bargaining unit. These
discussions bore fruit, producing a format for future bargaining and future contracts
between a union and a consortium of employers.
James Green is professor of labor studies and acting director of the Labor Resource Cen-
ter, College of Public and Community Service, University of Massachusetts Boston.
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The proceedings were chaired by Hubie Jones, senior fellow at the John W.
McCormack Institute at the University of Massachusetts Boston, who facilitated the
meetings of the providers and the union in 1994 and 1995. The event attracted special
attention because of the presence of John W. Sweeney, who two months earlier had been
elected the new president of the AFL-CIO and had previously, as president of the SEIU,
encouraged and promoted Local 509's efforts to create a partnership with the employers.
Sweeney described the signing of the agreement as a "historic moment" of "immense
importance for the labor movement, for the employer community, for the human service
provider community, and for those who believe in the public sector's responsibility for
the most unfortunate among us." He said that organized labor was committed to "build-
ing bridges" whenever the "shelling stops" and employers cease attacking unions. Now,
he declared, some visionary providers had agreed to cease fire and to create "a peace"
beneficial to labor and management.
In exchange for employers allowing employees to make a "truly free choice" in a
union election without discouragement from management, Local 509 committed itself to
forming a new partnership with national backing from SEIU and the AFL-CIO. If employ-
ees chose to be represented by SEIU, Sweeney explained, the union would enter into a
multiemployer agreement based on a shared commitment to provide highest-quality care
for the agencies in the most cost-effective ways. Unions would respect the challenge of
providing quality care in such a difficult environment as well as management's right to
make necessary decisions; the employers would respect the union's obligation to repre-
sent employees. Four agencies and their boards had, in Sweeney's words, made a commit-
ment to their employees and overcome "old-fashioned notions of management preroga-
tives" to forge a new partnership. Organized labor, always concerned to make unioniza-
tion pay off for members, wanted to make it pay off for these agencies and for the people
they serve. 1
What brought together a public employee union and some of the private, nonunion
employers it was accustomed to fighting at this historic moment? What process allowed
a union and representatives of management to overcome the adversarial relations that
have prevailed in many workplaces during the past two decades? What are the goals of
the partnership for providing quality care, for achieving efficiency and excellence, and
for improving the working lives of underpaid, highly transient, direct-care workers?
What implications does the partnership hold for public policy, for labor law, and for the
process of collective bargaining in the private human service sector? I address these
questions through an examination of the contexts in which the partnership was formed
and of the forces and motives that brought the parties together and analyze the issues
and problems involved and the potential gains to be achieved by all parties in human
services.
Contexts
During the 1950s, relatives of patients and human service professionals called for an end
to "warehousing" people in large institutions and for the creation of community care
facilities. In 1963 Congress made federal funds available to create community-based
settings, and in 1966 the Massachusetts Legislature enacted Chapter 735, the Compre-
hensive Mental Health and Retardation Services Act, which mandated state agencies to
create community care facilities and to move people out of the large state institutions. In
1966 the commonwealth of Massachusetts devoted 8 percent of its annual budget to the
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care and housing of more than 26,000 people in state mental hospitals and schools for
the retarded — the Department of Mental Retardation alone employed 16,000 workers.
Deinstitutionalization took place slowly over a period of years and began to reduce the
large workforce in state facilities. 2
Public employee unions, which had originated in some of these institutions, pro-
tested the loss of their members' jobs. 3 But these protests did not halt the deinstitut-
ionalization, which enjoyed strong public and government support. The courts ordered
community-based facilities to provide alternative but adequate care for
deinstitutionalized people. A number of private, mainly nonprofit agencies began to bid
on state contracts to provide services for the mentally ill and disabled in community-
based, mainly nonunion settings. Some of the providers were former employees of the
state-funded agencies that offered such services. Some viewed privatization as an op-
portunity to apply their ideas for improved treatment and care in settings free of some
state regulations and union contract provisions.
During the 1960s and 1970s, deinstitutionalization was largely driven by a concern
for the quality of care attainable in large state-run settings and a belief that services
delivered through smaller operations located in or near recipients' own neighborhoods
would be more humane and more effective. Although implementation of community-
based care for the mentally ill and mentally retarded was often limited by inadequate
funding, the promise of improved care through deinstitutionalization retained strong
support among professionals, recipients, and advocates.
In 1990 Massachusetts governor William Weld established a commission to study the
feasibility of closing several of the remaining institutions operated by the state Depart-
ments of Mental Health and Mental Retardation. The panel recommended closing nine
mental health facilities and public health hospitals over a period of three years, saving
the state $144 million initially and $60 million annually. The administration promised
to encourage the new private contractors to hire some of the workers employed at the
nine institutions. In its first six months in office the Weld administration laid off 3, 000
mental health and retardation workers; it is not clear how many found employment in the
private agencies.
For most employees of state institutions, closing the hospitals and state "schools"
meant layoffs and uncertainty. For those who sought work in the private sector the
change meant a move from large, highly structured workplaces with union pay scales
and negotiated labor-management relations to a varied set of working conditions and a
new set of employers who often underbid one another for state contracts.
The workers employed by private vendors in the mental health and retardation fields
are primarily paraprofessionals who work in group homes or halfway houses as well as in
day activity and treatment programs. About 25 percent are professionals who provide
treatment such as group therapy and psychotherapy, physical and occupational therapy,
and crisis intervention. The majority of the workforce— 65 percent— consists of direct-
care workers who help clients eat, bathe, dress, and carry out daily living and working
tasks. The remainder consists of clerical and maintenance personnel.
Although some former state employees migrated to the private sector, the privatiza-
tion of mental health and retardation services has created a new, largely nonunion work-
force with lower wages, fewer benefits, more part-time employment, and higher turn-
over — as high as 66 percent in some agencies, according to some sources. 4 One re-
search report estimates that in about 1,400 Massachusetts private agencies, 60,000
workers, 65 percent female, provide human services, between 18,000 to 25,000 of them
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in mental health and mental retardation in 300 agencies. A survey of 125 large vendors
reported a force of 84 percent non-Hispanic white workers, 1 1 percent non-Hispanic
black, 3 percent Hispanic, and 1 percent Asian. 5
Wages and benefits for these private-sector workers are 20 to 40 percent lower than
those of the public employees in the field. The starting salary for private direct-care
workers is $14,500 compared with $19,450 for public employees. The benefits available
to private employees also differ from those of public employees. Indeed, many private
agencies that require a thirty-five-hour week for benefit eligibility hire many workers on
a less than full-time basis, which makes them ineligible. An estimated 5 to 15 percent
of these employees are part-time "relief workers, and perhaps half the remaining
workforce is employed part time for necessary nighttime and evening coverage.6
The privately employed human service workers in Massachusetts represent a good
example of the national trend toward "contingent" work. The growth of irregular work
is characterized by the transformation of the workforce, the decline of real wages and
the loss of benefits, instability of employment, and a declining standard of living among
the working poor, who are predominantly female and people of color, native born and
immigrant. The growth of contingent labor also raises serious public policy questions
because many government policies and regulations, for example, the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act, may not cover those who work irregularly. 7 Critics charged that Massachu-
setts private agencies are not obeying state and federal labor regulations and that some
workers are overworked and not paid for their full time. 8
Massachusetts private providers receive 80 to 100 percent of their budget from state
funding. In fiscal year 1993 the Department of Mental Retardation served or supported
25,528 clients in residential, day, and work programs and half the department's budget of
$313 million was allocated to private vendors. Wages for Massachusetts direct-care
workers in the private sector had been frozen since 1988. Private providers interviewed
for this study expressed deep concern over this dilemma and the various negative conse-
quences it creates, like high turnover. They also worried about the lack of benefits, like
pensions, as well as training funds and programs for their employees. According to hu-
man service professor Elaine Werby, many private providers regarded their funding
dilemma as a sign of "disrespect for human service workers" on the part of the legisla-
tive and executive branches of state government.9
Besides their deep concerns about funding, human service providers expressed anxi-
ety about the managed care trend in government contracting. The Weld administration
contracted with one company to provide managed care for all Medicaid mental health
clients and human service professionals. Policy analysts, including Dr. Murray Frank of
the University of Massachusetts Boston, report that this trend worried many smaller
human service providers who feared that larger corporations would bid low, cut costs,
and force the smaller agencies to merge or to close their doors.
Labor unions representing human service workers in the public sector strenuously
resisted the trend toward privatization, which cost many members their jobs. As one
private employer indicated, privatization in Massachusetts did move jobs off the state
payroll to eliminate the costs of pensions and wage increases. The resistance to contract-
ing out government services reflected larger efforts by public-sector unions engaged in
difficult political battles against tax cuts, budget cuts, and contracting out as well as
struggles against public employers' demands for concessions in the bargaining process.
A low point for Massachusetts unions came in 1980, when a referendum limiting local
property tax rates, Proposition 2Vi, received an electoral majority. As a result, massive
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budget cuts created drastic layoffs of local public servants. 10 Public employee unions
were handicapped in their struggle to survive by the consistently unfavorable coverage
in the media, which contributed to a lack of public support. A Massachusetts attorney
representing human service providers expressed the opinion that public sector unions
were simply "unpopular."
The Service Employees International Union, whose locals represented many state
human service workers in Massachusetts, met these challenges, first with an effective
coalition campaign to defeat a drastic tax-cutting measure put forward in a statewide
referendum in 1990. It also opposed privatization with an aggressive public campaign.
Sandy Felder, then president of SEIU Local 509, a statewide union representing social
work professionals and other human service workers, said her organization did not insist
that only public service workers could provide services. The local opposed privatization
because it led to the "firing of state workers," reducing union membership, and to "the
reduction of standards, wages, and benefits for the privatized work force." The local sued
the Weld administration to prevent the hiring of laid-off state workers at considerably
less pay and benefits. Felder told the Boston Globe that "Weld has a vision of selling
state government to the lowest bidder without any vision of what sort of services the
state should provide." The union also charged that "there was a lot of fraud and lack of
oversight" in the private agencies. Local 509 organized a Vendor Waste Watch to point
out what it regarded as waste and fraud. 11
The local energetically supported a bill sponsored by state senator Mark Pacheco,
which, when passed over Governor Weld's veto, restricted privatization. The union's
aggressive struggle against privatization contributed to what one of the larger providers,
Sheldon Bycoff, head of Vinfen Corporation, called a "long-standing history of mistrust"
on the part of private agencies and their boards toward Local 509. However, many pro-
viders had already opposed unions in principle as well as in practice. Although public-
sector unions did organize a few community-based agencies in Massachusetts, they
experienced determined opposition from many private human service employers. The
Mental Retardation Providers Association issued an advisory strongly opposing union-
ization, which it believed would "demoralize the workforce through the assessment of
dues, the absence of consumer-focused values, and increased opportunities for divisive-
ness within provider agencies." 12
Private human service providers and their consultants attended meetings focused on
opposing unionization. An attorney retained by Massachusetts providers said that labor
relations lawyers received calls from an agency head who said, "I am being organized, I
hear there's literature being sent to my work sites . . . and you're gonna help me stop
this. You're gonna help me work with middle management and top management around
what we can and can't do under the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) rules and
other applicable rules regarding workers' right to organize." One agency director,
Chuck Howard, recalled being very "uncomfortable" in the meetings he attended with
other directors "to learn how to fight union organizing." He thought the union was ad-
dressing real employee concerns. "If there hadn't been so much involved in figuring out
how to start and run a nonprofit and manage it and deliver all of the services that were
part of it, we probably would have evolved to a more enlightened relationship with our
employees."
Public employee unions, in their attempts to organize privatized workers, faced some
of the same obstacles as unions in other areas of the economy. Antiunion opposition
grew after 1981, when President Reagan broke the air traffic controllers' strike and
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terminated union members as federal employees. During the 1980s, employers either
violated federal labor law to resist unionization or found ways within the law to dis-
courage it. The NLRB allowed employers to hold "captive meetings" during work
hours, issuing antiunion propaganda and intimidating, if not terminating, union sup-
porters and threatening to close up shop if employees chose unions. Even when a
majority of workers signed cards authorizing a union election, employers used the
intervening period to discourage those who had called for a union. In the 1980s the
percentage of union victories in elections declined as did the percentage of eligible
workers who belonged to unions. 13
Like other unions, SEIU faced serious challenges caused by employer opposition,
the failure of labor law, a changing workforce, an altered state of labor relations, and a
different political climate. Two decades of crisis discredited many of the old methods
and gave rise to new ideas about organizing, servicing, bargaining, and cooperating
with management. The crisis of the 1980s also provoked a recognition of the need for
strategic choices about the campaigns that unions mounted. Unions faced difficult
decisions about how to organize new workers, to fight concessions, and to make a
maximum impact with fewer resources. 14 This strategic turn is reflected in the AFL-
CIO's decision to create and fund a new institute whose goal was to recruit a young
cadre of organizers trained in new tactics.
SEIU has been in the forefront of several innovative organizing campaigns directed
toward sectors that were difficult to organize. Since many struggles against
privatization failed, SEIU debated alternative strategies and decided, after some con-
troversy, to organize privately employed service workers. In so doing, the union drew
upon the lessons of the civil rights movement, the women's movement, and commu-
nity organizations to approach service workers, whose numbers include more women
and people of color than the industrial workforce. 15 In the mid-eighties SEIU launched
an aggressive drive, Justice for Janitors, among privately employed janitors by regen-
erating the unions' organizing capacity and devising new tactics aimed at service
workers. 16
Unions organizing service workers and attempting to secure an election supervised
by the NLRB faced problems of high turnover, largely attributable to low pay and few
chances for advancement. These problems severely handicapped the usual process of
organizing a union by obtaining signatures from sufficient numbers of workers to call
an election administered by the NLRB. Although any workers in the bargaining unit
would ultimately be included in a negotiated union contract, only those employed at
the time of the election could vote for certification of the union as bargaining agent.
Given the high turnover rate, providers hostile to the union could stall the election
with procedural issues, expecting that enough eligible workers would leave their em-
ployment to invalidate the NLRB election. Faced with this dilemma, some unions
began using a blitz campaign, which puts pressure on an employer to recognize a
union as soon as a "card check" indicates that a majority favor unionization. 17
Proposing a New Model
The 1990 election of Republican William Weld and subsequent drastic reduction of
the state's Department of Labor and Industries caused labor unions even more concern
about their future. Although the Democrats retained majorities in both houses of the
legislature, and the union remained influential with many of those representatives, the
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future of public employee unionism seemed most problematic as a result of Weld's
efforts to cut taxes and shrink state government. It also became clear to many public
employee unions that, even with the Pacheco bill, privatization would continue and that
it would be difficult to reverse the process.
In 1993 Sandy Felder and other Local 509 leaders began to focus on the need to
organize the workers employed by private contractors. She believed that this task could
be accomplished only on a large scale, that it would "be easier to organize the workers
if the providers were neutralized," and that the process might involve some "mutual
gains bargaining" because, despite the "history of mistrust," the union and provider
community shared common needs.
Felder also began discussions with public policy advocates and public officials con-
cerning "the anomalous situation" of privately employed human service workers whose
wages were paid by the government but who were largely subjected to private control by
employers with little government regulation. She brought this situation to Professor John
Dunlop of Harvard University, distinguished labor relations expert, former secretary of
labor and chair of President Bill Clinton's Commission on the Future of Worker/Manage-
ment Relations. Felder described the difficult position of the direct-care workers em-
ployed by a myriad of private service agencies, all dependent on the will of the legisla-
ture and governor for compensation levels and other employment conditions. She em-
phasized the problems of privatized workers who are part of a "secondary workforce"
that lacked rights under state labor relations and private-sector labor relations governed
by federal law. She explained to Dunlop: "When you go to negotiate a contract with the
private agencies, they'd say, 'Well, we can't do any more because the state controls our
budget.' But then you try to go to the state labor relations, and they'd say, 'Wait. They're
a private entity.' So that in the end these workers are getting stuck in the middle." This
dilemma created by privatization "intrigued" Dunlop, who asked Felder to testify at the
federal government commission hearing he would chair in Boston on January 6, 1994.
Dunlop advised Felder to open discussions of this dilemma with providers and to get
a "neutral" to facilitate the dialogue. He also advised her to "keep the lawyers out of the
room." During the spring of 1994 Felder began meeting with a number of directors of
state-funded, nonprofit agencies, including Joe Leavy of Communities for People,
Michael Donham of Center House, and Dan Boynton of Bay Cove Human Services. She
advanced her ideas about a cooperative relationship that would help raise the abysmal
salary level in the field and provide the union with a chance to approach employees
without employer opposition. The union's approach soon became public when Local
509 launched an organizing drive, the Community Care Workers Campaign, to promote
a multiemployer partnership based on a new cooperative model of labor relations. The
campaign's "deeper purpose" was to create a "seamless web" in the delivery of mental
health and mental retardation services in Massachusetts.
In private discussions with providers, the union asked employers to remain neutal
and allow the union to contact workers. If the employers remained neutral, the union
could help lobby the government to fund increases in their workers' wages. During this
concentrated blitz of a few weeks' duration, Local 509 members volunteered to contact
nonunion workers and to distribute a questionnaire on working conditions. Only 150
responses were returned, indicating that 82 percent saw no opportunity for career ad-
vancement, 75 percent earned less that $20,000 a year, 62 percent received no addi-
tional pay for overtime, and 60 percent said they received insufficient training. Em-
ployer reactions to the campaign varied. According to one study, most providers "told
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their workers not to let the union in" and some "made threats of retaliation." 18
The particular difficulties of organizing privatized human service workers parallel
the obstacles faced by many union organizing drives. Unions that try to organize often
face tough opposition from employers who hire antiunion legal and consulting firms.
These "union busters" combine hard-hitting practices meant to intimidate union sympa-
thizers in the workforce with complex legal maneuvers meant to wear down the ener-
gies of union staff and exhaust union resources. In the late 1970s and 1980s, such union
avoidance strategy led to increases in firings for union activities and in more unfair
labor practice charges being filed. 19 Not only did antiunion employers actively discour-
age employees from unionizing, they refused to engage in good faith bargaining for first
contracts even after a majority of employees voted to join a union. As a result, unions
lost trust in the traditional time-consuming, frustrating process of organizing and bar-
gaining and sought more direct ways of gaining recognition and a first contract.
Given this tradition of employer opposition, Local 509's Community Care Workers
Campaign and its outreach to private providers represented a departure from SEIU's past
practice of organizing public workers and opposing privatization. Most union activists
found it difficult to accept the idea that "the enemy wasn't the providers," that the
power was in the hands of the governor and the legislature, and that unionists in Local
509 saw themselves "more as allies with the providers than as enemies." The idea of
approaching employers about organizing privatized workers aroused a lively debate
within union circles. Some argued that it would violate the National Labor Relations
Act's provisions against union bargaining with management before a majority of eli-
gible workers had chosen the union to represent them. In seeking to build relationships
with the provider community, Local 509 could not overstep the boundary between es-
tablishing a safe organizing environment and conducting contract negotiations before it
became the duly constituted bargaining agent. Others thought the idea of persuading
human service management to remain neutral was simply naive. Still others felt that the
Service Employees International Union had betrayed its members who remained com-
monwealth employees and that the union would be unable to represent the interests of
both sets of workers fairly. However, SEIU national president John Sweeney supported
the departure from past practice and encouraged Local 509's initiative.
Concerned with the criticism that unionized public workers are inefficient, Sweeney
promoted a new model of public sector unionism, which presents unions as guarantors
of quality services. SEIU's Public Division proclaimed a primary goal of enabling "pub-
lic workers to act as advocates for effective and responsive public service, at work and
in the public policy arena." Testifying before a federal commission on the public sector
in 1994, Sweeney argued that the achievement of excellence in public service would
require "meaningful worker participation in all levels of decision making concerning
the design and delivery of public service."20
Addressing the growth of nonunion workers doing public work through private em-
ployers, Sweeney asserted that cooperation would be impossible without protection
afforded to workers who would fear reprisals if they challenged or questioned manage-
ment decisions. "When employees are afforded the necessary assurances and protections,
they typically welcome the opportunity to work with management to achieve greater
efficiency in government." Ultimately, Sweeney maintained, the public would benefit
from reducing the differential between low wages and poor benefits in the private service
and the public sector. He also suggested that without an expanded scope of collective
bargaining, genuine labor-management cooperation would not be possible. Subjects like
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agency mission, not usually subjects of bargaining, would have to be put on the table so
that employees are "true partners" with managers. 21
It is increasingly common for unions and management to participate in joint com-
mittees around workplace issues. It is also increasingly common for employers at non-
unionized firms to establish vehicles for worker participation in some kinds of decision
making. Some union and academic critics argue that these forms of participation are
deceptive efforts to give employees a sense of involvement that will stave off unioniza-
tion efforts. Employer-initiated efforts have become controversial since they risk violat-
ing the National Labor Relations Act prohibition on "company unions," including em-
ployer-dominated committees. 22
However, in the industrial-union sector organizations like the United Auto Wokers
have entered joint decision-making programs with management; and some public-sector
unions have supported joint labor-management committees to devise ways of providing
better, more cost-effective services as an alternative to privatization. Many unions pro-
pose union participation in management as a way of addressing a number of problems:
increasing quality of care, consumer satisfaction, and public support; reducing conflict
and adversarial union-management relations in workplaces as well as improving training
and reducing turnover in the workforce.23
Powerful motivations led President Felder to reach out to providers who might be
interested in a new model of labor-management relations in the human services. She was
aware of public policy analysts who argued that the growth of part-time or contingent
labor required a change in union strategies as well as public policies. One study urged
unions to reevaluate their antagonism toward nontraditional forms of employment and
to focus instead on combining innovative collective bargaining with public policies that
"can control employer abuses of part-time and contingent work arrangement, extend the
benefit of flexibility to as wide a group as possible, and supplement employer-provided
fringe benefits — even though these policies may make unions appear less necessary."24
From the providers' side, strong opposition to unions remained, but some were willing
to talk to the union representatives, especially those who were heavily dependent on
state contracts and were frustrated by the wage freeze for direct-care workers. Tom
Riley, executive director of Better Community Living in New Bedford, felt that the
legislative committee on human services lacked trust in the providers to spend funds
appropriately. This was reflected in the budget freeze after 1988. Then in 1993, when a
budget increase did not even get out of a conference committee, a red flag went up, and
Riley became even more concerned about the "political process" involved in budgeting.
He began attending the McCormack Institute Forum meetings with Local 509 after he
received calls from people in his community, including legislators, encouraging him to
participate. He had begun working in the field at a time when staff salary increases
came regularly but during the long budget freeze he realized that his staff would not be
able to increase their pay without "as much public support as the agencies could possi-
bly get." "I looked on the horizon and I didn't see a lot of people . . . willing to support
our agency," he added, "but the union was knocking on the door and I said come on in"
and talk to staff. Used to dealing with unionized public servants as a member of his
local school committee, Riley thought that collective bargaining might give legislators
more confidence that budget increases would actually go to the direct-care workers and
"be assured that it's not going to be misspent." He thought the union might be able to
make the whole budgeting process and the process of wage determination more "rea-
sonable."
195
New England Journal of Public Policy
Sandy Felder's argument on behalf of the union addressed the providers' concern
with elevating wages and the legislature's concern that additional funds might not be
spent on direct-care workers. In the long run, she hoped, the legislature would see that it
makes sense to take responsibility for the privatized workforce in mental health and
mental retardation. Contracting out the services would not absolve government of its
responsibility to the workforce and the clients. "Wouldn't it be better," she asked, "to
have some standards and some knowledge of how much money" these workers will
receive instead of "just throwing money out to providers" who can spend it any way
they choose? The legislature needed a systematic way of getting the money out there to
the workers through the agencies, she maintained. "And why not have that systematic
way come through collective bargaining?" With a contract the government would have
the union make sure the funding ended up in the pay of direct-care workers, thus giving
the government more control over its spending on these programs.
Besides organizing a more powerful lobbying group and creating a better system for
the state to pay direct-care workers, the union saw another advantage in a
multiemployer agreement. The geographical dispersion of 300 agencies created prob-
lems for the union in terms of organizing, bargaining, and staffing. For Local 509, orga-
nizing had to proceed on an agency-by-agency basis, but the union hoped for a master
contract that would bring all, or at least many, agencies under one umbrella. The prefer-
ence for a multiemployer bargaining process shaped the union's approach from the
beginning. The multiemployer framework was seen not only as a way to streamline
contract administration; it could also achieve certain economies of scale. "The idea,"
said Felder, "was to bring them together collectively and to amass their power as one
group of providers, so that we then [could] go to lobby to get funding or get them to
share health insurance or workers' compensation or training. ... If they come together
in a multiemployer agreement, they can share things as well. So we felt that would be
an added . . . value to the workers of the agency."
Seeking to escape the old adversarial model without abandoning a commitment to
aggressive organizing, President Felder decided to reach out publicly to private provid-
ers to seek a partnership. Based on her conversations with providers, the support of
President Sweeney, and Professor Dunlop's advice, Felder looked for someone to con-
vene a meeting of unions and providers. She thought the union would need someone it
could trust but also "someone of stature who could bring providers to the table with us."
Negotiating a New Partnership
After preliminary discussions with providers, Felder and others agreed that Hubie Jones
was the best choice to facilitate a process of dialogue. The former dean of the School of
Social Work at Boston University and an influential voice in political affairs, Jones
enjoyed the authority and respect required to bring together diverse parties in the human
service world. As senior fellow at the John W. McCormack Institute of Public Affairs at
the University of Massachusetts Boston, he maintained a strong interest in human ser-
vices and public policy. After consideration of Felder's request for assistance in work-
ing with the provider community, Jones offered to conduct a forum under the sponsor-
ship of the McCormack Institute beginning in the fall of 1994. If the first meeting was a
success, he would plan more gatherings. For many providers the setting at the Univer-
sity of Massachusetts in Boston offered a neutral ground where issues could be explored
with civility and caution.
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Jones sought the assistance of two other institute fellows, Dr. Elaine Werby and Dr.
Murray Frank. Werby and Frank also had distinguished careers in human services as
administrators and teachers and both had been affiliated with the University of Massa-
chusetts Boston's College of Public and Community Service, a school that educates
human service workers and labor leaders. Werby was a professor in the Human Services
Center and Frank was the dean, a position he assumed after working for public em-
ployee unions in New York. The institute fellows played important facilitating and me-
diating roles in an unprecedented process of bringing together institutional actors dedi-
cated to the well-being of their constituencies, yet potentially and actually in conflict
with each other. According to Frank, who chaired many meetings, this was an appropri-
ate role for a public university with a service mission and an urban agenda.
Frank and Werby both emphasized the unique quality of the dialogue they facili-
tated. The parties had no experience of coming together outside the labor-management
framework and both sides harbored strong feelings about "the other side." Both parties
took considerable risks in getting to the table. Indeed, the providers who participated
did so without the support of their boards of directors, whose members usually opposed
unions strenuously; they even faced, as Frank put it, a degree of scorn from other direc-
tors and peers in their field.
The union's energetic efforts to invite providers from across the state to these meet-
ings, along with 509's ongoing organizing drive, brought the issue of unionization to
the forefront among the providers themselves. According to Boyce Slayman, executive
director of the Massachusetts Council of Human Service Providers, the council was
beset by two opposing points of view. Some members wanted to endorse the process of
exploration under way at the McCormack Institute to see if it would "result in getting
workers more money" and to see if the new model the union proposed would work.
Some wanted the council to oppose the union. As Slayman explained, "In some cases
providers had been unionized before, but the members had voted them out," while in
others, which had not been unionized, managers and board members believed "that
unions invest tremendous resources in keeping bad workers on the job." Furthermore,
these antiunion pro-viders refused "to submit to any more rules and regulations than . . .
absolutely necessary."
The McCormack Institute Forum "The Future of the Human Services Workforce"
was announced in a mailing to a wide variety of interested parties, including providers
in the mental heath and retardation field, public officials, and academics. The forum
organizers were surprised to find approximately thirty agencies represented at the meet-
ings in the fall of 1994 and through the winter and spring of 1995.
Their motivations varied. Many of the providers in attendance shared a concern over
the budget freeze and the low wage level of their direct-care workers. Some, like Chuck
Howard of Cooperative Human Services, had lost confidence in the capacity of provid-
ers "to lobby the legislature to get funding." Some providers who expressed interest
believed their competitors were underbidding them for state contracts by paying lower
wages. The union clearly appealed to the providers to create a common standard on
wages, and to take wages out of competition. Some, as Hubie Jones suggested, were
concerned that the union's organizing drive would lead to conflicts that would harm
their agencies. One executive director, Larry Urban of the Renaissance Club in Lowell,
knew that ten of his workers had expressed interest in unionizing after making contact
with organizers from SEIU Local 509. Unlike many employers, he was not worried about
the presence of the union organizers in the workplace because "our door has been wide
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open" for a discussion of any new programs or ideas. "It was not something I felt was
an intrusion, but just part of the open decision-making process that . . . has always gone
on here."
Urban was concerned, however, about the implications of unionization for "the over-
all operation of the agency." Since organizing was already going on among direct-care
workers in his area, he decided to attend the first meeting at the McCormack Institute to
find out what it was "all about" and to discuss a partnership that would not be based on
the "traditional model" of adversarial relations in which employers are "compelled to
come to the table" by the union. Urban hoped the new-model partnership could have a
positive goal of "empowering workers" through improved training and programs to
allow them to cooperate more effectively with employers who would have an added
advantage of participating in a multiemployer organization that would benefit all part-
ners.
The response to the first meeting of the Human Services Workforce Forum on No-
vember 16, 1994, was encouraging to the sponsors. The approximately thirty providers
who attended heard a number of presentations, including one by Philip Johnston, re-
gional director of the federal Department of Health and Human Services, and former
secretary of human services for Massachusetts. He articulated the widely held view that
the low salary levels of direct-care workers in the field had caused a major crisis for
human service agencies and their clients.
Jones thought that "the first meeting went very well" because there was "straight talk
from human service providers" who had felt burned by "some union tactics and behav-
ior." Providers expressed their concerns over the union's campaigns against privati-
zation, its efforts to expose contractor abuses, and what some employers believed to be
the protection of incompetent workers under union contracts. But they also made it
clear, said Jones, that "if they didn't work out some collaborative way of embracing
each other, they were going to kill each other off." Furthermore, "they weren't going to
get anywhere with the legislature in terms of getting more money."
A summary of the first meeting listed the following issues as the main topics of dis-
cussion: first, the hostile political climate for providers and workers alike; second, the
efforts of the governor to pit state workers against privatized workers; third, the negative
publicity generated by hostile infighting among human service interest groups; fourth,
the level of funding of mental health and retardation budgets leading to lower wages,
fewer benefits, higher turnover, and low morale.
The meeting reached a decision that the infighting within human services had to
stop and that "the only way to increase fiscal and political support, and improve work-
ing conditions, is to organize a new model of provider-worker cooperation." One model
proposed by Local 509 was that the union represent all private workers and negotiate
one contract on their behalf, which would also increase the bargaining power of the
union with the state legislature and allow providers to organize together more effec-
tively. The main problem with such a model was that it required trust from both sides,
and some providers expressed the view that collective bargaining was adversarial by
nature and promoted distrust; thinking that conflict might produce strikes, they wanted
no-strike clauses; they also believed unions defended workers "to the hilt" in grievance
procedures and placed management at a disadvantage. The providers' concern that
union contracts and grievance procedures protected incompetent or abusive workers
surfaced as a serious issue and would remain so.
Over the course of this meeting and those that followed, the union's representatives
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offered their new model of labor-management cooperation and pledged their formidable
political influence to the campaign to raise wages. The union expressed deep concern
with providers who made serious efforts to dissuade their employees from joining
unions; therefore, Service Employees International Union participants wanted to know
whether employers would enter an agreement to remain neutral while the union ap-
proached employees, allowing them to choose for themselves.
The mood created by the forum in the fall of 1994 encouraged hopes that the process
could move from tentative overtures to real commitments. Jones extended an invitation
to use the McCormack Institute as a meeting venue and offered to broaden the efforts
he, Frank, and Werby were making to facilitate the process.
The forum decided to create two subcommittees, one to work on a model agreement
and the other to focus on a strategy to lobby the legislature for the first increase in Men-
tal Health and Mental Retardation funding in seven years. However, disagreement be-
tween the union and the providers led to the dissolution of the second subcommittee,
and the union pursued its own course in lobbying for the increase during the spring of
1995. The union and the providers engaged in separate lobbying to increase funding for
human service employees. The overall effort, which joined that of human service advo-
cacy groups, led to an important public policy debate on the consequences of
deinstitutionalization and privatization.
In 1993 the administration of Governor William Weld issued a report praising the
"dramatic savings" resulting from the privatization of human services. Yet the privatized
workers who staffed deinstitutionalized, privatized services still suffered from frozen
wages. Emphasizing this paradox, human service advocates convinced the governor to
support an increase in funding directly targeted to wages for direct-care staff in residen-
tial programs. Weld recommended a $15 million increase in compensation for these
workers in his proposed budget for fiscal 1996 but did not lobby for it.
When the House Ways and Means Committee cut the increase from the budget, the
public policy debate took place very briefly. Committee chairman Representative
Thomas Finneran argued that the legislature could not earmark funding for privately run
agencies working under state contracts because it would "cross a line" between public
funding and public control; in effect, such a provision would violate private owners'
rights to determine wage levels for their employees. Responding to the cut, the Boston
Globe editorialized the following day that "modest raises for these workers are essential
if the state departments of Mental Health and Mental Retardation are serious about
providing quality care in humane settings, the goal of institutionalization." Rejecting
Finneran's view that public financing of human services did not permit public decision
making about working conditions, the Globe editorial maintained: "The state, the sole
buyer of these services, cannot escape accountability just because workers are em-
ployed by nonprofit agencies."25 This view mirrored that of the union and those private
providers who lobbied for an increase in wages for direct-care workers.
In any case, an important public policy question had been raised and debated: in an
era of entrepreneurial government, namely, Will public funding decisions include poli-
cies and practices that affect the workforce, and will private employers who contract
with the state be accountable to government as the ultimate employer?
An existing public policy requires the state to set wages for private employees on
state and federal construction projects where the "prevailing wage" rate and other labor
regulations are required. Some public policy advocates concerned about the expansion
of low-wage jobs in the service sector, including the human service sector, have urged
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the Clinton administration to develop a new social contract that would include these
workers just as the Roosevelt administration created a social contract with private-sec-
tor employers and unionized industrial workers in the New Deal era. 26
The idea of joint lobbying remained an important part of the union's case for creat-
ing a new partnership and for extending the precedent of minimum wage and prevailing
wage laws to the privately employed human service workforce. Sandy Felder believed
that the legislature might look more favorably on a salary increase for direct-care work-
ers if labor and management presented a united front.
As the forum discussions continued, the word spread rapidly throughout the human
service world and, according to Hubie Jones, providers kept well informed on the dis-
cussions. Ultimately, "the human service providers of power and substance" would need
to be part of a successful partnership, but their absence did not discredit the process.
They knew what was going on at the table, Jones explained. "We had their attention
even though they were not there in the room."
On two occasions, the Massachusetts Council of Human Services Providers' news-
paper carried front page reports of the McCormack Forum, which led some members to
criticize council director Boyce Slayman for giving the union too prominent a place in
council affairs. According to Slayman, one group wanted the council to "take a very
clear, firm antiunion posture," but there was another group who wanted "the council to
explore and investigate."
During the early months of 1995 the forum discussion led to substantial work in
drafting the basis for a cooperative agreement or partnership. A Model Committee de-
veloped a document that set out issues to be addressed in contract negotiations. Once
some providers became convinced that the union could indeed "add value" to their
workplace, they wanted to forge ahead to contract negotiations. However, the union was
careful not to undertake any actual bargaining in advance of recognition by the workers.
It did, however, orient the providers about the negotiation process and discuss what
kinds of topics could be brought up in bargaining.
The Model Committee's first draft agreement included eight principles intended to
be the basis of an agreement that private providers would be asked to sign. It pledged
that the parties engaged in developing the agreement would not "publicly attack each
other" during the process, nor would the union publicize the participation of any agency
in the process or single out any participating agency for an unusual effort to organize its
employees. A critical point, number 5, required that providers not take a position on the
issue of unionization so that its employees could "form their own opinions, pro or con,
free from fear of retaliation. Point number. 6 allowed for any party to terminate the
agreement at any time with notice to the other." That first draft, facilitator Elaine Werby
recalled, afforded the parties a chance to learn how to talk to one another and how to
handle the most controversial issues.
The Model Committee moved ahead and produced another draft document in April.
At this point, Werby pointed out, some of the wrangling over formal, legal issues re-
ceded as an atmosphere of greater respect and trust emerged. This draft proposed a
consortium of providers who would sign an agreement to cooperate with the union and
with each other on a whole range of issues. This fascinating document took another
approach to the key question of employer neutrality during the unions' organizing ef-
forts. The proposed language stated that employers would regard union organizing
"with the same spirit of neutrality in which the present providers participate [that is, in
the Human Services Workforce Forum]."
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The proposed agreement addressed some difficult issues raised by federal labor law
about the process of labor-management cooperation prior to the actual signing of a
collective bargaining agreement. The draft indicated that nothing in the cooperative
arrangement, especially specific terms of wages, hours, work rules, and so forth, could
be negotiated until workers voted for representation by a union.
The proposed model agreement identified those issues to be "jointly decided" by
management and labor and clarified the prerogatives of each party. It recommended
worker participation in decision making at the agency level, and "client involvement in
decision making about workplace issues." The document also proposed a provider/
union training and recruitment fund. In addition, it identified management rights, in-
cluding "business decisions" such as expansion and contraction, standard for intake of
clients, codes of ethics and behavior, and "all practices not specifically identified in
consortium agreements." One employer's expression of great concern about the right to
discipline, suspend, or terminate employees provoked much discussion; providers com-
plained that unions defended all grievants, including taking cases to costly arbitration
hearings. The proposed agreement reflected the union's willingness to engage in new
approaches to "fair problem solving," which allowed for alternatives to the "standard
contractual grievance procedure." Indeed, the parties envisioned recourse to such a
procedure "only if the agreed-to procedure has not been fulfilled." Facilitator Murray
Frank believed that this was a crucial sign of flexibility on the part of the union.
The agreement established terms under which the union could contact workers at the
participating agencies without opposition or harassment by agency management or
board of directors. Significantly, the agreement required providers to recognize the
union if a majority of workers elected to join by signing cards. To avoid the long delay
between the organization drive and the official election of union representation, the
agreement included card-check certification. Workers would sign cards indicating their
choice of Local 509 as bargaining agent, and the cards would be held and counted by a
neutral third party that would follow agreed-on procedures to validate and tabulate the
signatures. The Catholic Labor Guild in Boston, which has promoted union education
and labor-management cooperation for decades, was chosen to fill this role. (The guild
often conducts union elections and card checks as an alternative to the NLRB.) If a
majority of workers signed cards, the parties agreed to negotiate a multiemployer con-
tract, thus avoiding the common problem of employers' refusal to negotiate a first con-
tract.
Once the Model Committee completed its report, the next step was to move into the
recognition process. Five provider agencies initially decided to go forward. One soon
dropped out because its director became seriously ill and no replacement was sent to
this group. The four who continued to meet into the fall of 1995 were Michael Haran,
executive director of the Cambridge and Somerville Cooperative Apartment Project
(CASCAP), Cambridge; Chuck Howard, executive director of Cooperative Human Ser-
vices, Maiden; Tom Riley, executive director of Better Community Living, New
Bedford; and Larry Urban, executive director of the Renaissance Club, Lowell.
During the fall the providers who remained in the process decided to retain a lawyer
to help formulate their position. Attorney Frederick Misilo had served as assistant and
deputy commissioner of the Department of Mental Retardation and as the executive
director of a unionized human service agency. He represented a number of nonunion
providers opposed to collaboration with the union, but he was quite open to the notion
of facilitating a partnership with Local 509 and interested providers. Beginning in early
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September, Misilo began offering the active providers legal counsel on "reaching some
sort of an agreement regarding how to allow SEIU to communicate with their employ-
ees."
To Misilo the proposed partnership seemed to hold out the promise that workers
could stay in the mental health and retardation fields and do good work, "to view work-
ing with people with disabilities as a career," not as "transitional" employment. For this
to happen, working conditions and economic benefits would have to be "significant
enough" to attract workers to the field as a career. Until Misilo became involved, the
providers lacked the ability to negotiate with the union as a unified group. During the
fall, they, like the union, formed a united front, and discussions moved to the negotia-
tion stage more quickly under the guidance of mediator David Matz, a University of
Massachusetts Boston professor who directs the graduate program in dispute resolution.
The dialogue focused on a number of outstanding issues, including the welfare of
consumers in a future partnership. The agency directors emphasized the importance of a
workforce responsive to particular and constantly evolving needs and circumstances
that consumers present through different phases of development in their lives, relation-
ships, and skills. In many cases boundaries are blurred — consumers in some cases do
paid work for the service provider and are eligible for union membership; some con-
sumers live with foster families who are compensated for their expenses, while others
live in group homes with staff that changes with every shift or is only on site at certain
times to assist with certain activities like cooking or shopping. Consumers often need
care tailored to their particular needs, so both workers and providers face a major chal-
lenge in meeting those needs, offering them an exciting opportunity to exercise creativ-
ity and insight.
Several providers make conscious efforts to involve consumers in decision-making
processes ranging from choice of everyday activities to agency governance. The provid-
ers' attorney expressed the concern as follows: "The consumer should be at the table
with the employers and employees in the negotiating process." The interest of the con-
sumers should "serve as a focal point to the definition of the employer-employee rela-
tionship." This is "what brings the employer and employee together," unlike an "auto
factory where the goal is to make a machine." If, Misilo maintained, the interaction
between employee and the consumer "is dominated by the employees' concerns and all
the things that are traditionally part of a collective bargaining agreement, then the con-
sumer is potentially shortchanged." He added, however, that a previous agreement
reached between the state and the employees' alliance recognized that consumers "have
an important and vital part to play in the negotiation process and the collective bargain-
ing agreement."
Sandy Felder, having been part of the state labor negotiations that empowered con-
sumers, argued that consumer interests could be protected in a collective bargaining
framework. She and other union participants in the process emphasized their respect for
the needs of consumers and their families and the desire of these people for control over
significant aspects of their own lives. The rights the unions achieve for workers should
not negate consumers' rights, according to Felder. She believes that consumers should
have input into hiring and assignments as long as the worker has due process in person-
nel actions like discipline and termination.
Although some of these larger issues remained unresolved, the parties moved in
November toward an agreement based on the April Model Committee Report. Four
providers signed the final version of the partnership agreement on December 14, 1995.
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To John Sweeney, the president of SEIU, newly elected to the presidency of the na-
tional AFL-CIO on a reform program, the creation of a new partnership signified a new
environment for cooperation in which a "mutually beneficial peace can grow." Edward
Malloy, who succeeded Sandy Felder as president of Local 509, offered his support and
emphasized the precedence of the agreement that "allows workers to decide whether
they want to unionize without any influence from their employer."
Consequences
In January 1996, SEIU Local 509, with financial support from the international union,
sent out organizers to contact the employees of the four providers who had formally
agreed to remain neutral. The December agreement provided for access to workers by
union representatives on nonwork time, but when the organizing drive began, negotia-
tions were required to sort out what access would mean. One agency did not allow
union organizers in the group homes during breaks, arguing that consumer privacy would
be violated. In any case, the union gained access to work either through the workplace
or home visits. In February a sizable majority of workers signed cards requesting repre-
sentation by SEIU and another group in a third agency followed suit in April. However,
difficulties ensued in CASCAP as the union accused the director of failing to honor the
neutrality provision of the December agreement. The union petitioned for an NLRB
election at CASCAP, and on May 10, 1996, the union prevailed by a single vote.
That month Michael Gallagher, the SEIU staff person consistently involved in the
1995 negotiations, submitted a grant to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
(FMCS) to fund the partnership and provide staff for the consortium to facilitate coop-
eration between labor and management. Negotiations between the union and the four
providers began in the summer of 1996, with the grant proposal designed in part to help
facilitate the process and promote "interest-based bargaining" — a more cooperative
approach to bargaining — instead of "position-based bargaining" — the adversarial
approach in which each party begins negotiations with a list of explicit demands. In
October 1996 the partnership received the grant from the FMCS and in 1997 hired staff
persons to facilitate the cooperative work.
The formal negotiations between the union and the providers have not yet produced
a master agreement. It has been difficult to agree on a common set of wage provisions
for agencies with different workforces located in different parts of the state and with
different funding sources and vastly different wage scales determined by local labor
markets. Without the participation of many more agencies and employees, bargainers
have been unable to realize the economies of scale first envisioned. Even pooling the
costs of employee benefits has been difficult because insurance rates vary from one area
to another.
What are the prospects for extending the partnership forged in 1995? Boyce Slayman
of the Providers' Council is sympathetic to the need of the workforce for adequate com-
pensation, benefits, and good working conditions, but he said that many providers reject
the way they think unions conduct business. Many want to wait to see the outcome of
the union's innovations in labor-management relations. Slayman believes the discus-
sions of a "new model," a "non-aggression pact," means "just laying down the weap-
ons, not fighting." But he is still not sure that the agreement is "truly a new kind of
partnership." The Service Employees International Union has traditionally represented
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state workers and, he said, "there is no history of the SEIU expressing concern for the
what Boyce Slayman called "the providers' fears that ultimately there will be more
energy spent on grievance processes for bad employees than there will be on innovative
models of care delivery." Chuck Howard agrees that the union has had difficulty selling
its new model to agency managers who believe that a labor contract will prevent them
from getting rid of "people who abuse people or don't treat them with respect." This, he
thinks, is the union's main liability. The employers can help the union, but it has "to
shed that skin" in order for the process to move on. Howard remained active in the
forum after some providers left because he saw real possibilities of labor-management
cooperation in other sectors of the economy, which allowed both employers and unions
to improve.
The future of the partnership and its approach to new providers depends, among
other things, on addressing the problem of discipline and termination in the workplace
— to put it negatively — and staff development and improvement— to put the issue
positively. Ultimately, both labor and management agree that the human service field
offers a chance to create a new, less adversarial model of labor relations. Mediator
David Matz argued that providers should accept the inevitability of conflict in the work-
place and seek effective means of resolving disputes over employee performance. SEIU
spokesperson Nancy Mills agreed and offered to present "ten different examples" of
how contracts could be written to enhance flexibility and accountability, improve per-
formance, and allow for just-cause terminations. "We can devise processes that don't
put the union in the position of defending the worst, but we're concerned about fairness
and due process." In most union contracts a just-cause principle strikes a balance be-
tween the interests of management and labor because such a clause can be used to hold
"management to a high standard of consistency" and to avoid arbitrary terminations and
punishments. The old model of labor conflict over discipline and discharge cases could
be transcended, Mills maintained, but those innovations would have to be "joint solu-
tions" emerging from real contract negotiations.
The providers' legal counsel, Frederick Misilo, thinks the big question ahead lies
with the other employers, like those he represents who are still "zealously opposed to
collaboration." But if the focus turns to workforce development, he thinks there are
opportunities for cooperation even though public employee unions are still not popular.
"There is a great deal of insecurity" among human service workers. "This large
workforce out there . . . does not have pensions and [is] not in a large enough pool to
buy long-term insurance," he adds. "People who are working in . . . human services
shouldn't be forced into poverty."
Larry Urban hoped a partnership could improve "the identity of the whole human
services field." There are some 1 ,200 providers whose identity as a group is not well
defined in the public's mind. And, he adds, there is the lingering "stigma" attached by
the public to those who worked in the field of mental illness and mental retardation. So
a partnership with the union "may provide a vehicle for finally making some real im-
pact on the public and legislative perception of what human services are all about" as
well as "providing some base for the funding of these programs."
SEIU Local 509 followed through with its commitment to seek salary increases for
direct-care workers in private agencies, even though very few of those workers belonged
to the union. In 1995 its efforts in the legislature focused on creating an enforceable
minimum wage for direct-care workers. The legislature ordered a study of the wage
rates in the industry, which appeared in January 1996 and recommended a $12 million
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increase in compensation for direct-care workers earning less than $20,000 per year.
The governor proposed this increase in his budget, and thousands of direct-care workers
received a 4 percent raise. The union had helped to raise the issue of compensation for
privately employed direct-care workers' wage in the legislature. Eileen Haggerty, the
director of the SEIU Community Care Workers Campaign, believes the legislative cam-
paign made this group of neglected employees far more visible to lawmakers. In her
view, the traditional lobbying by the providers aimed at increasing human service fund-
ing without explicitly identifying the needs of the workers. Minimum wage laws are, of
course, traditionally supported by organized labor, notably in Massachusetts, where the
legislature increased the minimum wage in 1996 over the governor's veto. However, the
legislative campaign for direct-care workers represents a risk for SEIU Local 509,
namely, that the workers who receive wage increases through legislation will be less
responsive to the union's case that workers need collective bargaining and union repre-
sentation to improve their situation.
It is too early to know whether the Service Employees International Union will ben-
efit from the legislative approach to wage improvement. Indeed, it is too soon to tell
whether the Partnership for Quality Care will be able to create a lasting multiemployer
agreement with a union or whether that approach will draw other providers into a rela-
tionship with the union. Resistance to unionism remains strong among many agency
heads. In New Bedford, for example, where SEIU Local 509 has been organizing hu-
man services agencies, the union filed numerous unfair labor practice charges against
one employer that was held responsible for illegal labor practices by the National Labor
Relations Board.
Whatever the fate of the experimental model proposed by SEIU Local 509,
workforce problems will increase in the privatized human services, especially as it is
affected by cost cutting and other practices required by managed care. The head of the
largest private human service agency in Massachusetts, a strong foe of unions, has ar-
gued that cost savings are essential to the health of the industry, which should embrace
managed care.27
The managed care trend is supposed to increase consumer choice and lower costs,
but it also drastically affects the quality of care provided by human service workers and
the conditions under which they provide that care. Pressure to degrade professionals,
de-skill occupations, reduce benefits, and expand part-time employment will no doubt
be accelerated by managed care as part of the drive to cut costs and increase productiv-
ity. There is some movement toward unionization of doctors and other employees of
health maintenance organizations affected adversely by cost cutting and other results of
managed care. Doctors who are employees rather than private practitioners have in-
creased from 24 percent of the medical profession to an estimated 42 percent; some of
these physicians are choosing union representation and collective bargaining because they
are frustrated "at their loss of decision making" and from new demands like "gag rules that
restrict what doctors can tell patients about treatments to the practice of releasing patients
hours after surgery."28
Similar responses to managed care are appearing in human service agencies. Represen-
tatives of SEIU Local 509 have been emphasizing the problems of human service workers'
facing the impact of managed care. In March 1996 the union was approached by a group
of human service professionals who were discontented with the pressures caused by
managed care. The clinicians at the Tri-City agency in Medford, Massachusetts, led an
effort to unionize, and a year later a majority of the agency's 270 employees chose
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SEIU Local 509 in an election supervised by the NLRB. This is a traditional example of
one group of employees organizing one employer and then negotiating its own contract,
which may involve a historic adversarial relationship between workers and employers.
Unions like Local 509 will continue to represent workers in these situations, but it is
unlikely that the bulk of the growing low-wage workforce in the human service industry
will be represented as a result of organizing and bargaining based on single units or
agencies.
The partnership created by SEIU Local 509 and four providers attempted a different,
cooperative route. It seems unlikely, however, that this new model can survive and ex-
pand without supportive public policies. In 1933 federal labor legislation, the National
Industrial Recovery Act, demonstrated how public policies could be developed to pro-
vide codes affecting minimum wage rates and conditions of employment so that small
employers were not forced to keep wages low and reduce benefits in order to remain
competitive. When the Supreme Court ruled the NIRA unconstitutional in 1935, Con-
gress enacted the National Labor Relations Act to provide federal support for union
representation and collective bargaining for private employees. And in 1936 Congress
adopted a public policy based on the principle that private employers receiving public
revenues could be regulated by the government: the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act
(sponsored by a senator and a congressman from Massachusetts) extended federal regu-
lations, including hours and other terms of employment, to employees working on gov-
ernment contracts.
Like the New Deal federal labor policies, public policies at the state level could
promote collective bargaining and interest-based negotiations by ensuring that workers
have a chance to be represented. For example, in the spring of 1997, SEIU Local 509
filed a bill in the Massachusetts Legislature to remove any disadvantage in bidding for
state contracts from employers engaged in collective bargaining with their employees.
The bill — House 2118, Senate 587— also proposed increased pay for longevity, to
decrease turnover, and better pay for night-shift workers.
But public policies could do more than regulate wages; they could promote work-
force development by encouraging the creation of joint efforts to solve workplace prob-
lems, to improve employee training, to ensure employee stability, to advance quality
care, and to promote the importance and public appreciation of the human services and
the workers who provide those services. This study of a labor-management partnership
suggests that more can be done to advance the general welfare of the human service
workforce with union involvement than has been done without it. If policy-makers act
on the assumption that the quality of care will increase only if the quality of work life
increases in human service agencies, the partnership described here could well be a
prototype for future government-sponsored collaboration. Although many workers in
the human service workforce are employed by private agencies, its funding is largely
drawn from public revenues distributed by the government. It is therefore legitimate for
public policies to shape and regulate the conditions under which that workforce can be
fully trained, adequately supported, and fairly compensated, d*
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